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PACE INT'L L. REV.
"In the waning days of the United Kingdom's sovereignty over
Hong Kong, the majority's holding is a death knell for Hong Kong
corporations seeking access to our federal courts under alienage
jurisdiction."1
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 1997, just three days before Hong Kong would
revert back to China from the United Kingdom, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a split court
decision, affirmed the District Court's ruling in Matimak Trad-
ing Co. v. Khalily and D.A.Y., and stated that because Hong
Kong is not a "foreign state," Matimak Trading Company ("Ma-
timak"), a Hong Kong corporation, is not a "citizen or subject of
a foreign state,"2 and thus may not sue in federal court. Specifi-
cally, the Second Circuit held that Matimak is "stateless."3 Af-
ter both a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing
en banc were denied, Matimak petitioned the Supreme Court.4
Although Hong Kong has never been formally recognized
by the United States as a "foreign state," there have been con-
tradictory letters and statements from the Justice Department
and the State Department regarding this issue; as a result,
Hong Kong's status as a foreign state is not clear. 5 Notably, for
1 Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily and D.A.Y., 118 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 883, 139 L.Ed. 2d 871 (1998).
2 See id. The phrase "citizen or subject of a foreign state" comes from Title 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), a statute which gives the U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over
alien parties otherwise known as "alienage jurisdiction." See infra Part II & n.23.
3 See id. at 86. The court stated: "[A] stateless person-the proverbial man
without a country-cannot sue a United States citizen under alienage jurisdic-
tion." Id. (citing Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.
1983); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980); Standing Rock Sioux
Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974); Shoemaker v. Malaxa,
241 F.2d 129, 129 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam)).
4 See Matimak, 118 F.3d 76, petition for cert. filed, - U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Nov.
28, 1997) (No. 97-893).
5 See Matimak v. Khalily & D.A.Y., 936 F. Supp. 151, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(discussing a letter from the State Department urging the court to recognize Hong
Kong as a de facto foreign state for diversity purposes). But cf. Matimak, 936 F.
Supp. at 152 (citing Dunsky Limited v. Judy-Philippine, Inc., 95 Civ. 2035(KMW)
(April 4, 1995) which discusses a letter from the State Department confirming that
the United States does not recognize Hong Kong as a sovereign state); Matimak,
118 F.3d at 82 (noting that the Justice Department amicus brief states that the
State Department no longer urges treatment of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign
state).
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the past 155 years, Hong Kong has been under the governance
of Great Britain, a foreign state formally recognized by the
United States.6
The Matimak decision by the Second Circuit has attracted
significant international attention. The Special Administrative
Region of Hong Kong7 and the American Chamber of Commerce
in Hong Kong" are tracking the case because of concern that
this precedent could impact the ability of Hong Kong companies
to settle disputes with United States trading partners.9 In ad-
dition, the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland filed a Supreme Court brief as amicus cu-
riae in support of Matimak 10 because of their disagreement
with the Second Circuit, and because of concern that this prece-
dent could negatively affect all British Dependent Territories. 1 '
A "foreign state" is one formally recognized by the Executive Branch of the
United States. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3604, at 391 (2d ed. 1984). See also infra note 46 and accompa-
nying text. The Executive Branch of the United States includes the Department of
Justice ("Justice Department") and the Department of State ("State Department").
See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 864, 1408 (6th ed. 1990).
6 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85.
7 The Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong is the name given to Hong
Kong after July 1, 1997. This was established by the 1984 Joint Declaration be-
tween Great Britain and China. See LAN DOBINSON & DEREK ROEBUCK, INTRODUC-
TION TO LAW IN THE HONG KONG SAR 1 (1996).
8 The American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong was established in
1969 to develop commerce between the U.S., Hong Kong, and the Asia-Pacific re-
gions. See American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong Mission Statement (vis-
ited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.amcham.org.hk/AboutAmcham>.
9 See Mark Sharp, U.S. Court Rules Hong Kong Firms Stateless; Move Raises
Concern Over Right To Sue As Matimak Trading Loses Appeal, South China Morn-
ing Post, Oct. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File. The
South China Morning Post reported that the SAR Government is tracking the case
and is deeply concerned about the impact the case could have on the future ability
of Hong Kong companies to settle disputes with U.S. trading partners. The Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce is also looking into the matter. See id.
10 See Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *4, Matimak (No.
97-893), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
11 Currently the British Dependent Territories include: Anguilla, Bermuda,
British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, the British Virgin Is-
lands, the Cayman Islands, the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, the Falkland Is-
lands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena and dependencies, South
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Chan-
nel Islands and the Isle of Man. See Brief of the Government of the United King-
dom, supra note 10, at *6 n.5.
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Despite this international attention and concern 12 over the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.13
Essentially, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari solidi-
fies the Second Circuit's ruling and restricts Hong Kong corpo-
rations in disputes with American parties to settle the disputes
in state court, a forum known for being potentially "biased"
against foreigners and ill-equipped to handle international law
and matters. 14 This limitation could potentially inhibit trade
between Hong Kong and the United States because fear of fu-
ture disputes, without a fair forum to hear and decide those dis-
putes, could discourage Hong Kong companies from doing
business with U.S. companies.
Before Matimak, U.S. federal courts were divided on this
issue of jurisdiction, and did not agree on the correct approach
to take when deciding if jurisdiction exists when an entity from
an "unrecognized"15 foreign state, such as Hong Kong, is in-
12 See Sharp, supra note 9. The South China Morning Post quoted John Leo-
nard, an international law consultant who has been studying Matimak's case, as
saying:
The significance of the decision by the Second Circuit -whose influence on
other federal courts in America is just below the Supreme Court - is that
Hong Kong corporations (even, ironically, those formed as local subsidiar-
ies by US multinationals doing business in Hong Kong) cannot bring law
suits in federal courts throughout America, but would have to do so in the
state courts....
Id.
13 See Matimak, 118 S.Ct. at 883 (petition for certiorari denied).
14 See infra note 27 and accompanying text. See also Marian Nash Leich, Fed-
eral Diversity Jurisdiction, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 135-36 (January 1983) (quoting
the American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts 108 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI Study]). The ALI Study
states:
Whether the state courts in fact generally render fall, fair, and speedy
justice to alien litigants is largely beside the point. It is important in the
relations of this country with other nations that any possible appearance
of injustice or tenable ground for resentment be avoided. This objective
can best be achieved by giving the foreigner the assurance that he can
have his cases tried in a court with the best procedures the federal govern-
ment can supply and with the dignity and prestige of the United States
behind it.
Id.
15 If a foreign state is unrecognized, it means that the Executive Branch of the
United States has not formally recognized the state as an independent sovereign,
either through the exchanging of ambassadors or through an explicit statement of
recognition. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. See also infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
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volved in a civil suit with an entity from the U.S. In light of the
U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the "Act"),16 and in light of
the fact that Hong Kong is the United States' twelfth-largest
trading partner, with direct U.S. financial investment of almost
$12 billion, 17 it seems hypertechnical to conclude that a Hong
Kong corporation is not a "citizen or subject of a foreign state"
because Hong Kong has not been formally recognized by the Ex-
ecutive Branch of the United States.' 8
This article will first examine the history and theory behind
alienage jurisdiction, which gives our federal courts jurisdiction
over foreign parties. Second, Matimak will be critically ana-
lyzed in light of other federal court precedents, which held that
Hong Kong corporations could sue in federal court under alien-
age jurisdiction. Third, Hong Kong and its significant trade re-
lations with the U.S. will be considered, along with the U.S.-
Hong Kong Policy Act of 199219 and the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration of 198420 and their effect on Hong Kong's reversion
back to China. The article concludes with a proposal that would
allow Hong Kong companies unquestionable access to U.S. fed-
eral courts, without the need for formal recognition of Hong
Kong by the Executive Branch.
II. ALIENAGE JURISDICTION
Federal judicial power extends to "all Cases ... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
16 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-32 (1994). The U.S. Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 was
enacted by Congress in anticipation of Hong Kong's reversion to China on July 1,
1997. It manifests Hong Kong's relationship with the U.S., and makes clear that
the U.S. desires U.S.-Hong Kong relations to remain the same after the reversion.
See id.
17 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81 (citing Letter from Jim Hergen, Assistant
Legal Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of
State, to Marshall T. Potashner Attorney for Matimak, of 6/21/96 at 3). This
amount has increased, since Matimak was filed, to approximately $14 billion. See
Hong Kong Head Sees Asia as the Economic Giant, XINH UA NEWS AGENCY, Sept.
11, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
18 Hong Kong has never been formally recognized by the United States. See
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
19 See supra note 16.
20 See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1366, 1371 [herein-
after the "Sino-British Joint Declaration"].
1998] 579
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Subjects." 21 The judicial power over suits between aliens and
U.S. citizens has been in force since 178922 and is referred to as
"alienage jurisdiction," codified by sections 1332(a)(2), (3), and
(4) of Title 28 of the United States Code. 23 Neither the Consti-
tution nor section 1332 defines "foreign state" for diversity juris-
diction purposes. 24 Courts have generally held that a foreign
state is one that has been formally recognized by the Executive
Branch of the United States.25 When determining alienage ju-
risdiction, courts also frequently rely on letters and briefs from
the Justice Department and the State Department to determine
the status of certain parties to a case. 26
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKI, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.2, at 274 (2d ed.
1994).
23 See id. Diversity jurisdiction, of which alienage jurisdiction is a part, is
codified by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332 which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between-
citizens of different states;
citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or different States....
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
24 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) defines "foreign
state" as one including a political subdivision of a foreign state or agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994). The application of this
definition to § 1332(a)(2) has been disputed and will be discussed later in this
note. See infra Part V.
25 See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 5, § 3604, at 391. See also Iran
Handicraft and Carpet Export Center v. Marjan International Corp., 655 F. Supp.
1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988) where the court
explained:
Because the Constitution empowers only the President to 'receive Ambas-
sadors and other public Ministers,' the courts have deferred to the execu-
tive branch when determining what entities shall be considered foreign
states. The recognition of foreign states and of foreign governments,
therefore, is wholly a prerogative of the executive branch. Thus, it is
outside the competence of the judiciary to pass judgment upon executive
branch decisions regarding recognition.
Id. at 1277 (citations omitted).
26 See Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1963), modi-
fied on other grounds, 328 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1964) (relying on a statement from the
Department of Justice urging the court to allow Cuban corporations access to fed-
eral court); Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 978 (N.D. Ill.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/4
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The primary reason for alienage jurisdiction is to provide a
neutral forum.2 7 The framers of the Constitution thought that
the federal courts could provide the proper forum for foreign
parties and protect them from potential bias and prejudice in
the state courts. 28 Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers,
stated that "the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned." 29
The fear of state court bias and prejudice led to another fear:
1980) (relying on a letter from the State Department confirming that Taiwanese
citizens could sue in federal court in holding that Taiwan is a foreign state for
purposes of alienage jurisdiction).
27 See The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809)
where Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains
apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible
fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribu-
nals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen....
Id at 87.
See also Leich, supra note 14, at 135. Ms. Leich, a legal adviser for the De-
partment of State, cites a letter from Powell A. Moore, the Department of State's
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to Congressman Kastenmeier,
dated August 9, 1982 which states:
The Federal courts have exercised jurisdiction in cases involving
aliens since the first Judiciary Act in 1789. The Department of State
welcomes the continuation of Federal Jurisdiction in these cases. The
United States is responsible under international law to provide aliens fair
and impartial justice and access to the United States court system. In
some cases treaties provide specific standards of access to the judicial pro-
cess, but even without a treaty, an alien is entitled to certain internation-
ally recognized minimum standards of justice. Under international law,
moreover, the Federal government is responsible for any denial of justice
by a State court, even though the Federal government has no direct au-
thority over those tribunals. Thus, while the Department has great confi-
dence in the competence, integrity and impartiality of the State court
systems, the availability of civil jurisdiction in Federal courts under a sin-
gle nationwide system of rules tends to provide a useful reassurance to
foreign governments and their citizens.
Id.
28 See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 519 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). See also WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra
note 5, § 3604, at 383; supra note 27 and accompanying text. For a modern analy-
sis disputing that bias exists in American courts see Kevin M. Clermont & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Commentary: Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1120 (1996).
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. E. Cooke ed.,
1961). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Founda-
tions and Modern Justifications For Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involvino
7
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that if federal jurisdiction was not allowed for foreign parties,
possible entanglements with their sovereigns could result.30
"Providing a neutral federal forum avoids the appearance of in-
justice or grounds for resentment in the relations of the United
States with other nations."3 1 With these thoughts in mind, the
First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which allowed
federal jurisdiction over civil actions involving foreign parties.32
It has been argued that the framers of the Judiciary Act of
1789 were unfamiliar with the idea of statelessness, and thus
intended that alienage jurisdiction extend to all cases involving
a U.S. citizen and any non-U.S. citizen.33 Specifically, the origi-
nal language and legislative history of the Judiciary Act only
used the terms "foreigner" and "alien," and permitted suit in
federal court for any civil action where the amount in contro-
versy was more than $500, and "where an alien is a party."34
From this, it appears that the framers intended that all foreign-
ers or aliens be allowed to sue in American federal courts re-
gardless of their status, as long as they were not U.S. citizens. 35
This conclusion was reached in 1833 by Chief Justice Story
when he reviewed the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitu-
Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 10-16 (1996) (discussing the rationale behind
allowing federal jurisdiction when an alien is a party to a lawsuit).
30 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 888, at 633-34 (R. Rotunda and J. Nowak ed., 1987). Possible entangle-
ments include negative commercial impacts. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 11-14.
31 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 88 (citing Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd. v.
Hibdon, 602 F. Supp. 1378, 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). See also ALI Study, supra note
14 and accompanying text.
32 See Johnson, supra note 29, at 17-20.
33 See Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness
and Alienage Jurisdiction in Light of Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 11
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 215 (1996). See also WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER,
supra note 5, § 3604, at 394 stating:
To support jurisdiction under Section 1332 of the Judicial Code, an
alien must be a 'citizen or subject' of a foreign state. These words, which
also appear in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, are designed to
include any aliens regardless of the form of government in his country.
Id.
34 See Biancheria, supra note 33, at 210-11 & n.68 (citing Pennsylvania Rati-
fying Convention, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 492-93 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d
ed. 1866)); Johnson, supra note 29, at 17-20.
35 See generally Biancheria, supra note 33, at 206-15. But see Blair Holdings
Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying that status as a
non-U.S. citizen is sufficient to invoke alienage jurisdiction).
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8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/4
WHY IS THERE ANY QUESTION
tion and wrote: "The inquiry may here be made, who are to be
deemed aliens entitled to sue in the courts of the United States.
The general answer is, any person, who is not a citizen of the
United States."36
III. MATIMAK TRADING Co. v. KHALIL Y AND DA. Y
A. The District Court
Plaintiff Matimak is a corporation organized under the
laws of Hong Kong, with its principal place of business in Hong
Kong. It filed suit for breach of contract in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York against
Albert Khalily and D.A.Y. Kids Sportswear, Inc., two New York
Corporations. 37 Matimak invoked the court's diversity jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), which provides jurisdiction
over any civil action arising between "citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state."38 In an order dated June
10, 1996, District Judge Kimba M. Wood raised, sua sponte, the
issue of whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause Hong Kong is not recognized by the United States as a
foreign state. 39
Matimak argued that the court should recognize Hong
Kong as a "de facto foreign state,"40 and specifically relied on a
letter from the State Department that urged the court to recog-
nize Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state for diversity pur-
36 STORY, supra note 30, § 891, at 635.
37 See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 151.
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
39 See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
40 De facto recognition, as opposed to de jure recognition, is a principle, which
allows jurisdiction over a party whose government or state has not been formally
recognized by the Executive Branch of the United States. See Chang, 506 F. Supp.
at 978 n.3. In Chang, the district court permitted suit under alienage jurisdiction
between a Taiwanese national and a U.S. hospital despite the lack of formal recog-
nition of Taiwan as a foreign state by the U.S. The court based its decision on de
facto rather than de jure recognition of Taiwan, and found that the significant
trade relations, and the cultural and other contacts with Taiwan on a nongovern-
mental level, were factors to be considered when deciding de facto recognition. See
id.
See also Tetra Finance Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), to
be discussed infra Part IV(B)(1) (finding de facto recognition for Hong Kong). The
test for de facto recognition involves whether the Executive Branch regards the
entity as an independent sovereign. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80 (citing Iran
Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1278). See also infra note 46 and accompanvine text.
19981
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poses. 41 As previously noted, the Executive Branch includes the
State Department, and courts have relied on letters and briefs
from both the State Department and Justice Department. 42
Judge Wood acknowledged that "it is not the role of the judici-
ary to recognize foreign states, but rather that is a function of
the [E]xecutive [B]ranch." 43 Despite this acknowledgment, and
despite the letter from the State Department in support of rec-
ognizing Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state, Judge Wood re-
jected Matimak's argument. She stated: "Although there are
strong commercial ties between Hong Kong and the United
States, the establishment of such ties does not constitute recog-
nition of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state by our govern-
ment."44 Without any explanation, Judge Wood appeared to
rely on a previous letter written by the State Department in
April 1995,45 which stated that the United States does not rec-
ognize Hong Kong as a sovereign state,46 and ignored the more
recent letter from the State Department that Matimak relied
on, which urged recognition of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign
state. 47
Judge Wood then distinguished cases relied upon by Ma-
timak,48 and stressed the importance of the principle that the
41 See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152 (citing letter from the State Department
written by Assistant Legal Adviser Jim Hergen). This letter, stating that Hong
Kong should be treated as a de facto foreign state, was written to Marshall T.
Potashner, the attorney for Matimak on June 21, 1996. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at
81-82.
42 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
43 Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
44 Id.
45 See id. (citing letter from State Department also written by Hergen in the
case of Dunsky Limited v. Judy-Phillipine, Inc., 95 Civ. 2035(KMW), dated April 4,
1995).
46 When recognizing a "foreign state," either de jure or de facto, the Executive
Branch of the United States often determines whether the state is a free and in-
dependent sovereign. This is what is meant by the term "sovereign state," and is
consistent with the definition of"state" in international law, which requires that a
certain "state" have a defined territory and population under the control of a gov-
ernment, and is able to enter into foreign relations with other countries. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
(1987). See also Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242,
1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that a "foreign state" is a "political entity that is
recognized by the United States as a free and independent sovereign.").
47 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48 See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152-53.
[Vol. 10:575
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judiciary has no power to recognize foreign states.49 Interest-
ingly, Judge Wood also noted that after Hong Kong reverts to
Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, it may be possible that
"Hong Kong companies will be considered to be citizens of
China for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction."50 Judge Wood
also pointed out that prior cases involving other British Depen-
dent Territories 51 that have allowed diversity jurisdiction were
based on policy arguments, arguments that Judge Wood found
to be unpersuasive given the importance and need for deference
to the Executive Branch when determining who could bring suit
in federal courts. As a result, Judge Wood dismissed the case in
its entirety without prejudice to refile in state court. 52
B. The Court of Appeals
1. The Majority
Matimak appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit which reviewed, de novo, the order of the
district court. 53 Circuit Judge McLaughlin, writing for the ma-
jority, affirmed the district court's ruling and held that Hong
Kong may not be regarded as a "foreign state," and that conse-
quently, Matimak is not a "citizen or subject of a foreign
state."5 4 Judge McLaughlin began his analysis by looking at
the history of alienage jurisdiction.55 To counter Matimak's ar-
gument that Hong Kong should be recognized as a de facto for-
eign state, Judge McLaughlin analyzed Murarka v. Bachrach
Brothers, Inc.,5 6 a case heavily relied upon by Matimak.
49 See id. at 153.
50 Id. at 152.
51 See id. at 153 (citing Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d
731 (2d Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991)).
52 See id.
53 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 76.
54 See id. at 86.
55 See id at 79. Judge McLaughlin noted that "[tihis is not the first time we
have had to navigate what we have earlier described as a 'shoal strewn area of the
law.'" Id. This is in reference to Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution
and to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See id. Judge McLaughlin also describes the two
rationales underlying alienage jurisdiction: to avoid entanglements with other sov-
ereigns, and to provide protection from bias in state court. See Matimak, 118 F.3d
at 82-83.
56 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
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In Murarka, an Indian partnership sued a New York corpo-
ration in New York federal court. The Second Circuit ruled that
there was alienage jurisdiction despite the fact that the com-
plaint was filed before the United States had formally recog-
nized India as a foreign state. The court noted that India was in
the process of severing ties with Great Britain. 57 Despite the
similarity of Murarka to Matimak's situation, Judge McLaugh-
lin dismissed the analogy as "inapt."58 He stated: "India, which
had been a colony of Great Britain, was about to become an in-
dependent sovereign nation. Not so for Hong Kong, which is
about to be absorbed into China. Hong Kong is merely changing
fealty."59
Like the district court, Judge McLaughlin placed heavy em-
phasis on the need for deference to the Executive Branch in de-
ciding what a foreign state is for alienage jurisdiction. He
wrote:
... [T]he de facto test depends heavily on whether the Executive
Branch regards the entity as an 'independent sovereign nation.'60
'Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a
judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by
the legislature and executive departments of any government con-
clusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens,
and subjects of that government.' 61
Judge McLaughlin then pointed out that at the time Ma-
timak instituted suit, Hong Kong was a British Dependent Ter-
ritory, ruled by a governor appointed by the United Kingdom. 62
He noted that Hong Kong was fully autonomous with regard to
economic and trade matters, but was dependent on the United
Kingdom with regard to defense and foreign affairs, and would
still be dependent on China for defense and foreign affairs after
the reversion on July 1, 1997.63 In addition, Judge McLaughlin
57 See id. at 552.
58 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
59 Id.
60 Id. (quoting Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1278).
61 Id. (quoting Jones v. Unites States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Vermilya-
Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948); United States ex rel. D'Esquiva v.
Uhl, 137 F.2d 903, 906 (2d Cir. 1943)).
62 See id. at 81-82.
63 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81-82 (citing the United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-32 (West Supp. 1996)). The Act provides that "Hong
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pointed out that the Justice Department, who filed an amicus
brief for this appeal, stated that "[t]he State Department no
longer urges treatment of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state
and withdraws any reliance on this contention."64 As a result,
Judge McLaughlin concluded that Hong Kong is not regarded
by the United States as an independent sovereign entity, and
thus could not invoke alienage jurisdiction. 65
Interestingly, the Justice Department in its amicus brief,
although withdrawing de facto recognition of Hong Kong, stated
nevertheless that because Matimak is a Hong Kong corporation
governed by a Hong Kong law modeled from a specific British
law, it should be considered a subject of the United Kingdom for
alienage jurisdiction purposes.66 Despite, however, this direct
statement from the Justice Department, Judge McLaughlin dis-
agreed and declined to follow their direction. He said: "Hong
Kong corporations... are no more 'subjects' than 'citizens' 67 ...
[and] [tihe fact that the Hong Kong... [law] may be 'ultimately
traceable' to the British Crown is too attenuated a
connection." 68
Judge McLaughlin briefly mentioned other cases that have
found jurisdiction over Hong Kong parties, but dismissed all of
them.6 9 He stated that these other district courts have allowed
Kong will continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy on all matters other than
defense and foreign affairs." U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 16,
§ 5701(1)(B).
64 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82. In response to this "unexplained change in
stance" by the State Department, Judge McLaughlin did not do any further in-
quiry and, without explanation, decided that he didn't have to resolve this issue.
He stated: "Although we need not resolve this issue here, we note that the State
Department's unexplained change in stance following the district court's opinion
might under different circumstances require further inquiry into its ulterior mo-
tives." Id.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 86. Matimak is governed by the Hong Kong Companies Ordi-
nance of 1985 which was patterned from the British Companies Act of 1948. See
id. at 86, 90. As a "subject" of the United Kingdom, a foreign state recognized by
the U.S., Matimak would have had access to federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2), supra note 23.
67 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86 (citing 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 0.75 (3d ed. 1996)).
68 Id.
69 See id. at 84 (citing Timco Engineering, Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp. 925
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the presence of a Hong Kong corporation as a plaintiff
in a suit against several U.S. corporations does not deprive the court ofjurisdic-
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Hong Kong diversity jurisdiction "cursorily and without benefit
of briefing from the parties... without any analysis ... or with-
out considering the stance of the Executive Branch . . .70
Judge McLauglin then relied on Windert Watch Co. v. Remex
Electronics Ltd.,71 which held that Hong Kong was not a "for-
eign state" under section 1332(a)(2). 72 Ultimately, Judge Mc-
Laughlin decided that Matimak is "stateless."73 He wrote: "[A]
stateless person-the proverbial man without a country-can-
not sue a United States citizen under alienage jurisdiction."74
As a result, he affirmed the district court's ruling and concluded
that the suit was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.75
2. The Dissent
In a stinging dissent, Circuit Judge Altimari stated: "[T]he
majority's holding is a death knell for Hong Kong corporations
seeking access to our federal courts under alienage jurisdic-
tion."76 He focused on the history of alienage jurisdiction and
statelessness and determined that "[a] stateless corporation is
an oxymoron . . . a corporation cannot be created without the
imprimatur of the state."77 He then focused on the United
tion), to be discussed infra, Part IV(B)(1); Refco, Inc. v. Troika Inv. Ltd., 702 F.
Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a Hong Kong corporation is a "citizen or
subject of a foreign state" under 22 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)); Creative Distributors, Ltd.
v. Sari Niketan, Inc., No. 89 C 3614, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10436, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 1, 1989) (holding that a Hong Kong corporation may sue in federal court be-
cause of the significant trade and commercial relations between the U.S. and Hong
Kong), to be discussed infra, Part IV(B)(3)).
70 Id.
71 468 F. Supp. 1242.
72 See id. at 1245. In Windert, the defendants were Hong Kong corporations
who moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed
with the defendants and dismissed the suit after finding that Hong Kong was not a
foreign state, but rather a colony of Great Britain. The court relied on the fact that
the United States had never granted formal recognition to Hong Kong as an in-
dependent state. See id.
73 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86.
74 Id. (citing Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.
1983); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980); Standing Rock Sioux
Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974); Shoemaker v. Malaxa,
241 F.2d 129, 129 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam)).
75 See id. at 88.
76 Id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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States' economic relationship with Hong Kong and on how influ-
ential Hong Kong is in the international community. 7s He also
relied on Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 79 in which the Sec-
ond Circuit deferred to the Executive Branch in determining
alienage jurisdiction, and found that because the Department of
Justice had spoken on the issue, the court was bound to follow
their direction.
Like Calderone, Judge Altimari argued that because the
Executive Branch had clearly spoken in Matimak's case, the
majority should have followed their direction.80 He stated: "In
this case, the Department of State and the Department of Jus-
tice unequivocally made their wishes known-they withdrew
support of de facto recognition of Hong Kong and urged this
Court to recognize Hong Kong as a 'citizen or subject' of the
United Kingdom."8 '
Judge Altimari recognized Hong Kong as a unique force,
critical to international policies and global economic expansion,
and concluded that access to U.S. federal courts is justified and
should be allowed.8 2 He stated:
There are adequate constitutional, statutory and prudential
grounds to open our federal courts to Matimak by: (1) recognizing
Hong Kong as a 'foreign state' for the limited purpose of alienage
diversity jurisdiction; (2) recognizing Hong Kong as a political
subdivision of a foreign state; or (3) recognizing Hong Kong's peo-
78 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 90 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
79 325 F.2d 76. In Calderone, the court allowed a suit between a Cuban corpo-
ration and an American company because the Justice Department had directly
spoken on the issue. The court stated:
Considerations of both international relations and judicial adminis-
tration lead us to conclude that the onus is on the Department of State, or
some other department of the Executive Branch, to bring to the attention
of the courts its decision that permitting nationalized Cuban corporations
to sue is contrary to the national interest. Since silence on the question
may be highly desirable, it would not be wise for the courts unnecessarily
to force the Government's hand. However, in this case we need not merely
rely on the maintenance of the status quo, because the Executive Branch
has made its wishes known .... [Tihe Department of Justice has urged
that nationalized Cuban corporations have access to our courts ....
Id. at 77.
80 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 91 (citing Calderone, 325 F.2d at 77) (Altimari,
J., dissenting).
81 Id.
82 See id. at 92 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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ple and entities as 'citizens or subjects' of the United Kingdom
today and after July 1, 1997, of the People's Republic of China.
8 3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Deference to the Executive Branch?
The Justice Department, as amicus in Matimak, explicitly
stated in its brief to the court that it wanted Matimak to be
treated as a "subject of [the] United Kingdom."8 4 This would
have allowed Matimak access to the Second Circuit under alien-
age jurisdiction.8 5 Despite the majority's acknowledgment of
this explicit statement, and despite the majority's own urging of
deference to the Executive Branch through a lengthy discussion
in its opinion,8 6 the majority abruptly disagreed with the Jus-
tice Department and declined to follow their request.
The majority viewed the statement by the Justice Depart-
ment, not as an explicit statement or request by the Executive
Branch as to their desire to allow a Hong Kong corporation ac-
cess to federal court, but instead, as an argument capable of be-
ing refuted. 7 This is not only contrary to the majority's legal
analysis, but is contrary to other precedents where courts have
deferred to statements made by the Executive Branch in letters
and briefs, which ultimately decided for the court the question
as to whether alienage jurisdiction was satisfied.8 Thus, the
majority's decision in Matimak was not a result of deference to
the Executive Branch. Instead, the decision could be regarded
as one that is disrespectful of the Executive Branch.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 86.
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), supra note 23.
86 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81-83.
87 See id. at 86.
88 See Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1280 n.4 (relying on State Depart-
ment's letter in deciding that the court had jurisdiction over an Iranian corpora-
tion); Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 858, 861 (D. Del.
1982) (relying on letter from State Department in holding that court had jurisdic-
tion over an Angolan corporation).
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B. Ignoring Precedents
Besides declining to follow explicit statements from the
Justice Department, the majority also seemed to ignore prece-
dents,8 9 even within its own circuit.
1. Tetra Finance Ltd. v. Shaheen90
In Tetra Finance, Tetra Finance Limited and Hong Kong
Deposit and Guaranty Company Limited were both plaintiffs,
incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong and involved in liqui-
dation proceedings in the Hong Kong courts. They brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York for breach of fiduciary duty and to recover in excess of
$35 million in loans made to the defendants, two U.S. citizens. 91
The defendants relied on Windert, and tried to have the case
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to sec-
tion 1332(a)(2) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.92
With regard to the issue in Windert, which was whether a
Hong Kong corporation was precluded from jurisdiction in fed-
eral court because Hong Kong was not a foreign state, District
Judge Werker stated:
I do not think that, if I had to decide the issue presented in
Windert, I would necessarily find that a Hong Kong corporation is
precluded from suing or being sued in federal court. It would
seem hypertechnical to preclude Hong Kong corporations from as-
serting claims in our courts simply because Hong Kong has not
been formally recognized by the United States as a foreign sover-
eign in its own right. Indeed, federal courts previously have en-
forced the judgments of Hong Kong courts and have applied the
laws of Hong Kong in appropriate situations. 93
89 Besides the precedents involving Hong Kong companies discussed in the
text, there are other cases involving companies from other British Dependent Ter-
ritories, not formally recognized by the U.S., where the courts have found jurisdic-
tion. See Netherlands Shipmortgage, 717 F.2d at 735 (holding that the court had
jurisdiction over a Bermuda corporation); Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 (holding that
the court had jurisdiction over a Cayman Islands corporation); Cedec Trading Ltd.
v. United American Coal Sales, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (hold-
ing that the court had jurisdiction over a Channel Islands corporation).
90 584 F. Supp. 847.
91 See id. at 848.
92 See id.
93 Id. (citations omitted).
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He then noted the significant economic and commercial ties be-
tween the United States and Hong Kong, 94 and also noted that
the Windert decision was expressly rejected by other
jurisdictions. 95
Because the claims of Tetra Finance and Hong Kong De-
posit were assigned to court-appointed liquidators who were
both citizens of the United Kingdom, Judge Werker did not
have to decide the issue in Windert and denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, his view on the issue of Hong
Kong was clear-Hong Kong corporations should be allowed ac-
cess to our federal courts.
2. Timco Engineering v. Rex & Co. 96
In Timco Engineering, a U.S. corporation and a Hong Kong
corporation sued several U.S. corporations, including one Hong
Kong corporation, for various claims in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 97 With re-
spect to some of the claims, the court decided that diversity
jurisdiction was satisfied.98 The court noted that it is not cer-
tain whether Hong Kong is a foreign state, and mentioned the
Windert case as one case that ruled Hong Kong is not a foreign
state, but then noted that Windert "does not ... represent an
unchallenged view of Hong Kong's status."99 The court then
mentioned the Tetra Finance case and stated: "I find the rea-
soning of the Tetra . . . court persuasive, and I will hold that...
the presence of a Hong Kong citizen as a plaintiff in a suit be-
94 See id. Judge Werker wrote that "[tihe commercial and cultural realities of
the modern world dictate that diversity jurisdiction should be granted to certain
governmental entities that have not been formally recognized." Tetra Finance, 584
F. Supp. at 848 (citing Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 978 n.3).
95 See id. (citing Great China Trading Co. v. Cimex, U.S.A., Inc., No. CV-80-
4221-MML (C.D.Cal., March 17, 1982)). Besides the Tetra Finance court's rejec-
tion of Windert, many other courts have criticized and declined to follow Windert.
See e.g., Timco Engineering, 603 F. Supp. at 930, discussed infra Part IV(B)(2);
Creative Distributors, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10436, at *4-5, discussed infra Part
IV(B)(3); Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1279-81; Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243;
Cedec Trading, 566 F. Supp. at 724 n.2.
96 603 F. Supp. 925.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 929.
99 Id. at 930 n.8.
[Vol. 10:575
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/4
WHY IS THERE ANY QUESTION
tween otherwise diverse United States citizens does not deprive
this court of subject matter jurisdiction."100
3. Creative Distributors, Ltd., v. Sari Niketan, Inc. 10 1
Creative Distributors, Ltd. is a Hong Kong corporation in-
corporated pursuant to the laws of Hong Kong with its principal
place of business in Hong Kong. They initiated suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against Sari Niketan, Inc., an Illinois corporation. In conclud-
ing that diversity jurisdiction did exist, the court quoted from
Chang v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital,'0 2 and focused on
the trade and commercial relations between the U.S. and Hong
Kong, and the need for flexibility in foreign affairs.10 3 In its
analysis, the court also discussed both Tetra Finance and
Windert and declined to follow the reasoning in Windert. Spe-
cifically the court stated:
We are not persuaded by the Court's reasoning in Windert.
Rather, we choose to rely on the Court's reasoning in Tetra Fi-
nance and Chang. The United States trades and invests exten-
sively with Hong Kong, our courts have enforced Hong Kong
judgments, and our courts have applied Hong Kong law in appro-
priate cases. Furthermore, as the court stated in Tetra Finance,
courts have in fact allowed the United Kingdom colonies of Ber-
muda and Caymen [sic] Islands to sue in federal court .... Based
100 Id.
101 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10436.
102 506 F. Supp. 975.
103 See Creative Distributors, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10436, at *2. The court
stated:
The United States may recognize a political entity as a foreign state
by either formal or de facto recognition .... Although formal recognition
may only be conferred by the United States President, de facto recognition
may be conferred in numerous ways. For example, courts have held that
an exchange of ambassadors ... or significant trade relations or cultural
contacts... with another "state" are sufficient to warrant de facto recogni-
tion of a foreign state.
Id. (citations omitted). The court then quoted from Chang:
There must be flexibility in foreign affairs as we approach the 21st cen-
tury, so that the United States and the citizens may maintain 'commer-
cial, cultural, and other relations' with another nation and its citizens
even in the absence of official diplomatic relations .... Allowing only
foreign nationals of countries 'formally recognized' by the United States to
sue in our federal courts would impair that flexibility.
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977 n.2).
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upon these facts, it appears that Hong Kong has been recognized,
de facto, by the United States and its court system. 10 4
C. Current International Realities
Even more significant than ignoring the preceding prece-
dents, the majority's decision also ignored important U.S. rela-
tions with Hong Kong. Commercial trade between Hong Kong
and the United States is at an all time record high.10 5 This fact,
along with the significant amount of money that the U.S. cur-
rently has invested in Hong Kong,10 6 should have been enough
to convince the majority in Matimak to allow any Hong Kong
company with a dispute against a U.S. company access to fed-
eral court. Many disputes are likely to arise from the volume of
business transactions being conducted between the United
States and Hong Kong. The United States would not want to
hinder and discourage that business by unfairly closing the
doors of its federal courts. Moreover, the majority's decision
stands as precedent, allowing not only the possibility of a threat
to U.S.-Hong Kong business relations, but also a threat to for-
eign relations between the U.S. and the United Kingdom, 10 7
and the U.S. and China.' 08
1. Hong Kong-U.S. Bilateral Ties
Hong Kong has long been recognized as a world force in in-
ternational trade. They are the United States' twelfth-largest
104 Creative Distributors, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 10436, at *5 (citing Netherlands
Shipmortgage, 717 F.2d 731; Lehman v. Humphrey Caymen, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339
(8th Cir. 1983)).
105 See Herman Pan & Lilian Wu, Taiwan's Exports To U.S. Booming, CEN-
TRAL NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws
File. See generally Economic & Trade Information on Hong Kong (last modified
Sept. 4, 1998) <http://www.tdc.org.hk/main/economic.htm> (tracking current inter-
national trade with Hong Kong).
106 Approximately $14 billion. See Hong Kong Head Sees Asia as the Economic
Giant, XiNHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Curnws File.
107 The United Kingdom has implied in a Supreme Court brief that the Ma-
timak decision threatens the possibility of foreign entanglements between the
United Kingdom and the U.S. See Brief of the Government of the United King-
dom, supra note 10, at *8.
108 See infra Part IV(C)(1) (discussing China's dependency on Hong Kong to
handle its trade; if U.S. relations with Hong Kong are threatened, U.S. relations
with China will also be threatened).
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trading partner, with bilateral trade between the U.S. and
Hong Kong reaching $14.05 billion in the first seven months of
1997.109 In addition, direct U.S. financial investment in Hong
Kong totals almost the same amount as bilateral trade, $14 bil-
lion. 110 Thirty-seven thousand Americans live in Hong Kong,
the U.S. maintains a consulate-general there, and eleven hun-
dred U.S. companies operate there."' In the United States,
Hong Kong has established and maintains the Hong Kong Eco-
nomic & Trade Office, the Office of the Hong Kong Trade Devel-
opment Council, and the Hong Kong Tourist Association. 1 2
Hong Kong is also a contracting party to the General Agree-
ment of Tariffs and Trade, and is granted "most favored nation"
status 1 3 by the United States." 4
As significant as U.S. trade relations with Hong Kong are,
Hong Kong also handles one-half of China's exports. 115 Approx-
imately sixty percent of U.S. trade with China passes through
Hong Kong, making Hong Kong an important conduit for U.S.
trade with China. 116 Furthermore, since retaining sovereignty
over Hong Kong, China has become the fourth largest trading
partner of the U.S., surpassing Great Britain and Germany."17
In the first seven months of 1997, bilateral trade between the
109 See Pan & Wu, supra note 105. Through November 1996, Hong Kong's
trade with the U.S. exceeded $23 billion. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 91 (Altimari,
J., dissenting) (citing Department of State, 1996 Country Report On Economic Pol-
icy and Trade Practices).
110 See supra note 106.
111 See Barbara Hackman Franklin, China Today: Evil Empire or Unprece-
dented Opportunity, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Aug. 1, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
112 See U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 16, § 5711(4).
113 "Most favored nation" status is granted by the U.S. to its trading partners,
prescribing equality of international treatment in foreign trade. The primary ef-
fect is to lower import tariffs or duties.
114 See U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 16, §§ 5712(3), 5713(4).
Hong Kong is also a member of the World Trade Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, and numerous other prominent world organizations. See RODA
MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, Two INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES 191-94 (1997)
(listing the various international organizations in which Hong Kong is a member).
115 See Economic & Trade Information on Hong Kong: Economic Relations with
the Chinese Mainland (last modified Sept. 4, 1998) <http://www.tdc.org.hk/main/
economic.htm>.
116 See Lee Siew Hua, US Assured Democracy Will Grow in HK, THE STRAITS
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
117 See Pan & Wu, supra note 105.
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U.S. and China reached $39.69 billion, setting a new record. 118
This is significant because what affects Hong Kong's trade with
the U.S. will also affect China, a country formally recognized as
a foreign state by the United States. 119 With China now over-
seeing the foreign relations of Hong Kong,' 20 it would not be in
the United States' best interest to close the doors of its federal
courts to Hong Kong companies. China's trade is significantly
dependent on Hong Kong's trade with the United States, thus
any impediment to business and trade relations between the
U.S. and Hong Kong would ultimately affect United States' re-
lations with China.
2. U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992
In anticipation of Hong Kong's reversion to China on July
1, 1997, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act was passed in
1992.121 The Act calls for relations between the United States
and Hong Kong to remain the same after the reversion is com-
pleted. Specifically, the Act notes the important role that Hong
Kong plays in today's world economy, and the strong economic
and cultural ties with the United States that "give the United
States a strong interest in the continued vitality, prosperity,
and stability of Hong Kong.' 22 The Act also states that the
U.S. will treat Hong Kong as a fully autonomous territory with
regard to economic and trade matters,1 23 but not on matters
dealing with defense and foreign affairs. 24 This implies that
the foreign affairs of Hong Kong were to be governed by Great
Britain before the reversion, and will be governed by the Peo-
ple's Republic of China after the reversion. 25
Interestingly, section 5713(1) of the Act states that "[t]he
United States should seek to maintain and expand economic
and trade relations with Hong Kong and should continue to
118 See id.
119 See Republic of China v. Merchants' Fire Assur. Corp., 30 F.2d 278, 279
(9th Cir. 1929) (finding recognition by the Executive Department of the National
Government of the Republic of China).
120 See U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 16, § 5701(1)(B).
121 See id. §§ 5701-5732.
122 Id. § 5701(4).
123 See id. § 5713(3).
124 See id. § 5701(1)(B).
125 See U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 16, § 5701(1)(A)-(B).
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treat Hong Kong as a separate territory in economic and trade
matters, such as import quotas and certificates of origin."
126
The Act's specificity with regard to what is meant by "economic
and trade matters" weakens the majority's argument in Ma-
timak that Hong Kong is to be fully autonomous from the
United Kingdom and China with respect to all economic and
trade matters. Surely, matters that deal with import quotas
and certificates of origin are very different from matters involv-
ing contract disputes, like that in Matimak. It makes sense
that Hong Kong would be fully autonomous with regard to spe-
cific trade matters like import quotas and certificates of origin
because those factors are unique to Hong Kong. However, with
regard to disputes between Hong Kong companies and U.S.
companies, because of the origin and purpose of alienage juris-
diction, it would make more sense that, although a dispute may
arise because of international trade, the actual process to re-
solve the dispute and its affect on foreign trade relations should
be governed by the foreign affairs branch of Britain (prior to
reversion) and China (after the reversion).
The Act also specifies that the resumption of China's sover-
eignty over Hong Kong would "not affect treatment of Hong
Kong residents who apply for visas to visit or reside perma-
nently in the United States, so long as such treatment is consis-
tent with the Immigration and Nationality Act."1 27 Section
1101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is one statute
where Congress has defined "foreign state." It states: "The term
'foreign state' includes outlying possessions of a foreign state,
but self-governing dominions or territories under mandate or
trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states."
28
This language could be interpreted in a couple of ways. First,
"outlying possessions of a foreign state" could mean Hong Kong
would be considered an outlying possession of Great Britain
before the reversion, and of China after the reversion. Thus,
Hong Kong would fall under this first part of the Immigration
Act's definition of foreign state. Second, if Hong Kong is re-
126 Id. § 5713(1).
127 See id. § 5711(6).
128 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(14) (1997). The juris-
diction of the federal courts extends to actions under the immigration laws of the
U.S. and proceedings to naturalize aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (1997).
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garded as a "self-governing dominion or territory under man-
date or trusteeship" of Great Britain before the reversion, and
of China after the reversion, it would again fall under the defi-
nition of foreign state. Either way, it seems clear that the Im-
migration Act, written by the U.S. legislature, and ratified by
the Executive Branch, intends to define Hong Kong as a foreign
state.129
3. "One Country, Two Systems"
At the end of the Opium War and through the Treaty of
Nanking, China ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain in 1842.130
Since that time, Hong Kong remained under British rule and
governance. In 1982, negotiations between Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of Britain, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaop-
ing of China, began to address the expiration of leases of land in
the New Territories that would expire in 1997.131 As a result,
the Sino-British Joint Declaration (the "Declaration") was
signed in 1984.132 The Declaration embodies Deng's "one coun-
try, two systems" philosophy, whereby Hong Kong is allowed to
maintain most of its current economic and social system in force
before the reversion, although it will become once again part of
China after the reversion. 133
129 Congress recognizes Hong Kong as a foreign state for per-country numeri-
cal limitations under section 202 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 90 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I),
at 196 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6710).
130 See Franklin, supra note 111. See also DOBINSON & ROEBUCK, supra note 7,
at 120. Besides the Treaty of Nanking which ceded Hong Kong Island to Britain in
perpetuity, there were two other treaties during the nineteenth century regarding
other parts of Hong Kong. The southern part of Kowloon peninsula and Stonecut-
ters Island were ceded in perpetuity to Britain in 1860 by the Convention of Pe-
king, and the New Territories (92 percent of the total territory) were leased to
Britain in 1898 for 99 years under the Convention of 1898. It was this third treaty
in 1898 that brought about the decision by the United Kingdom to negotiate for
Hong Kong's return to China in 1997. See Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra
note 20, at 1367.
131 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
132 See Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at 1367.
133 See id. at 1371. Part 3(2) of the Declaration states:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under
the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high
degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the
responsibilities of the Central People's Government.
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By the terms of the Declaration, China resumed sover-
eignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, and Hong Kong is now
known as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HK-
SAR"),134 subject to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the People's
Republic of China. 135 Under the Basic Law, the laws previously
in force in Hong Kong before the reversion, will be in effect after
the reversion. 136
At the time that Matimak was decided, Matimak was incor-
porated under the laws of Hong Kong in force before the rever-
sion, while Hong Kong was still under Great Britain's
governance. The British Nationality Act of 1981 defines who
British Citizenship is conferred upon. 13 7 Hong Kong was con-
sidered a "British Dependent Territory," ruled by a governor ap-
pointed by the United Kingdom.' 38 In matters of defense and
foreign affairs, Hong Kong remained dependent on the United
Kingdom.' 39 Yet, as far as corporations were concerned, the
British Nationality Act applied only to natural persons and not
to corporations. 140 Specifically, the British Companies Act of
1948 states: "[Tihe privileges of British nationality are not con-
ferred on corporations formed under the laws of Hong Kong."'
4 1
Thus, Great Britain enacted the Hong Kong Companies Ordi-
nance of 1984, modeled after the British Companies Act, to gov-
ern Hong Kong corporations.' 42  Under the Hong Kong
Companies Ordinance, a Hong Kong corporation like Matimak
is considered a citizen of Hong Kong, and not a citizen of Great
Id. Part 3(5) of the Declaration states: "The current social and economic systems
in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style .... " Id. at 1372.
134 See DOBINSON & RoEBUCK, supra note 7, at 120. The HKSAR is to be gov-
erned by the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [hereinafter "the Basic Law"]. The Basic Law was en-
acted by the National People's Congress of China to prescribe the system to be
practiced in the HKSAR to ensure the basic policies of the Declaration. See id.
135 See id. See also Basic Law, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511, 1512 (Article 1 of
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China states that Hong Kong is an 'inalienable part of the People's
Republic of China').
136 See Basic Law, supra note 135, at 1521.
137 See British Nationality Act, ch. 61, § 38(1), sched. 6 (1981).
138 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81.
139 See id.
140 See Windert, 468 F. Supp. at 1246 (citing British Companies Act 1948
§ 406).
141 Id.
142 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 90 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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Britain.143 Therefore, since the Basic Law states that the laws
in force in Hong Kong prior to the reversion will be in effect
after the reversion, 144 the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance is
still in effect and Hong Kong corporations remain citizens of
Hong Kong.
Despite this narrow interpretation of law, both the Declara-
tion and the Basic Law now governing Hong Kong embody
Deng's broad "one country, two systems" philosophy. Hong
Kong corporations may be technically citizens of Hong Kong,
but Hong Kong is nevertheless now a part of China. Only one
country exists.145 The majority in Matimak was surely aware of
this philosophy since it has been discussed extensively since
1984, and is even specifically mentioned in the U.S.-Hong Kong
Policy Act of 1992.146 However, the majority in Matimak, just
three days before the reversion, refused to consider that Hong
Kong and China were soon to be "one country," and based their
decision only on the technical interpretation that Matimak was
only a citizen of Hong Kong. 147
4. Other British Dependent Territories
With the Second Circuit's decision in Matimak left stand-
ing, other British Dependent Territories 148 will have a more dif-
ficult time trying to invoke alienage jurisdiction in U.S. federal
courts. Substantial business is conducted with the U.S. by cor-
porations in the British Caribbean Dependent Territories and
Bermuda. 149 As of May 1997, there were 563 banks incorpo-
rated in the Cayman Islands, 377 insurance companies and
33,792 business companies.' 50 In Bermuda, there were 1,400
insurance companies and 6,824 business companies. 51 In the
143 See id.
144 See Basic Law, supra note 135, at 1521.
145 The Declaration states that Hong Kong shall use the name "Hong Kong,
China" when developing and maintaining relations with other states or organiza-
tions. See Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 20, pt. 3(10), at 1372.
146 See U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 16, § 5701(1)(C).
147 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86. The majority stated: "Matimak was incorpo-
rated under... the Companies Ordinance of 1984 of Hong Kong, and is entitled to
the protection of Hong Kong law only." Id.
148 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
149 See Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom, supra note 10, at *8.
150 See id.
151 See id.
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British Virgin Islands, there were 130,000 incorporated busi-
nesses, and in the Turks and Caicos Islands, there were 11,000
business companies and 1,911 insurance companies. 152
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (the "Government") filed a brief as amicus
curiae in support of Matimak's petition to the Supreme
Court. 15 3 The Government thought the Second Circuit's deci-
sion was a serious matter that could have grave consequences,
and criticized the decision as being "a needlessly narrow and
technical interpretation of the United States Code."' 54 They
stated:
The British Government has a substantial interest in expres-
sing to the Court its views with respect to this proceeding ....
[Tihe question of whether corporations organized under the laws
of the British Dependent Territories may have access to the U.S.
federal courts pursuant to alienage jurisdiction remains an impor-
tant one for the British Government. There are thousands of cor-
porations organized under the laws of those territories which
would be denied access to the U.S. federal courts under the view
of the alienage jurisdiction adopted by the court below. The
United States and the United Kingdom are major trading part-
ners of one another and have a close working relationship on both
commercial and foreign policy matters .... [I]t would not be in
the interest of that relationship for the corporations of the British
Dependent Territories to be excluded from the United States fed-
eral courts. 155
The Government urged that companies incorporated under
Hong Kong law operate under the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. 156 Therefore, Matimak, at the time of its suit, should
152 See id.
153 See id at *4.
154 Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom, supra note 10, at *5.
155 Id. at *3.
156 See id. at *5. The Government criticized the majority in Matimak by
stating:
The majority in the court below acknowledged that a foreign state is
entitled to define who are its citizens or subjects. Nonetheless, its analy-
sis of the relation between the United Kingdom and the corporations or-
ganized under the laws of the British Dependent Territories was not
sound .... It appears to the British Government to be illogical and unfair
to deem corporations organized under the laws of the Dependent Territo-
ries to be 'stateless,' as the court below has done, and hence as excluded
from the benefits of the alienage jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts.
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have been regarded as a British company, and not as a stateless
entity.15 7 In support, the Government stated:
The United Kingdom's sovereignty over its Dependent Terri-
tories (which until June 30, 1997 included Hong Kong) as a mat-
ter of international law, together with the strong constitutional
relationship between the United Kingdom and its Dependent Ter-
ritories, lead to the conclusion that the corporations of those terri-
tories should be regarded as 'subjects' of the United Kingdom for
the purposes of U.S. alienage jurisdiction. 158
As one of the deciding factors for holding Matimak to be
"stateless," the majority in Matimak had stated that "there...
[was] no danger of foreign entanglements, as there ... [was] no
sovereign with whom the United States could be [sic] become
entangled."'1 59 In response, the Government stated: "[Tihis as-
sumption ... [is] incorrect ... [as] evidenced by this brief ....
The United Kingdom is keenly concerned that the citizens and
corporations of its Dependent Territories be able to bring and
defend suits in neutral foreign fora concerning their global
commerce."160
V. PROPOSAL
Now that Hong Kong is clearly under the sovereignty of
China, the U.S. federal courts should allow Hong Kong compa-
nies unquestionable access to sue or be sued under alienage ju-
risdiction. It is important to avoid characterizing any entity of
Hong Kong as "stateless."' 6 ' To do so, could result in possible
resentment by China, thus affecting U.S. relations with China.
Therefore, to satisfy alienage jurisidiction, and to avoid future
"entanglements" with China, any Hong Kong company should
be considered a "subject" of China.
Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
157 See id.
158 Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom, supra note 10, at *5.
159 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 87.
160 Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom, supra note 10, at *8.
161 When determining whether parties to a civil action have alienage jurisdic-
tion, the federal courts should try whenever possible to find that alien parties have
nationality and are not stateless. See Biancheria, supra note 33, at 199-203.
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A "'[s]ubject' includes those owing their allegiance to a sov-
ereign monarch."162 As the majority in Matimak decided, Hong
Kong is not an independent sovereign, and thus cannot be a
"foreign state." That is so, not because they are stateless, but
because they owe their allegiance to some other sovereignty-
the United Kingdom before the reversion, and China since the
reversion. Hong Kong, therefore, is now a subject of China, and
because Hong Kong's corporations or companies will likewise
ultimately owe their allegiance to China, they too should be con-
sidered "subjects" of China.
Furthermore, as Deng's "one country, two systems" philos-
ophy made clear, Hong Kong is undeniably a part of China, 163
and the foreign affairs of Hong Kong are now under the com-
plete control of China. Like the Government of the United
Kingdom argued in its brief to the Supreme Court, that Ma-
timak should have been considered a subject of the United
Kingdom, the government of China will also likely argue that
any company of Hong Kong should now be considered a subject
of China.164
Perhaps in the future, Hong Kong may be considered a
"political subdivision" of China, thereby providing another way
to satisfy alienage jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) al-
lows diversity jurisdiction in any civil action between "a foreign
state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citi-
zens of a State .... ,"165 Section 1603(a) provides: "A 'foreign
state' . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state
.... "166 This definition of "foreign state" in section 1603(a)
162 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 5, § 3604, at 394. "'Citizen' applies
to those from countries in which sovereignty is thought to belong to the collective
body of the people." Id. See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
663-64 (1898) (stating that the term "citizen" is analogous to the term "subject,"
and the change of phrase results from a change of government).
163 The majority in Matimak stated: "Hong Kong ... is about to be absorbed
into China .. . [and) is merely changing fealty." Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
164 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 668 (stating "it is the inherent right of every
independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution
and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.").
165 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1994).
166 Id. § 1603(a). A "political subdivision" is defined as "[a] division of the state
made by proper authorities . .. for [the] purpose of carrying out a portion of those
functions of state which by long usage and inherent necessities of government
have always been regarded as public." BLAcKs', supra note 5, at 1159.
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would apply to section 1332(a)(2), 167 and thus jurisdiction
would be satisfied when a "citizen or subject of a political subdi-
vision" is involved in a civil dispute with a "citizen of a
State."168 Therefore, if Hong Kong is considered to be a "polit-
ical subdivision," all citizens or subjects of Hong Kong would be
covered by alienage jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2).
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of Hong
Kong and alienage jurisdiction, and has refused to do so in Ma-
timak, leaving the task to the lower federal courts. The federal
courts must keep in mind that Hong Kong, China, and the
United Kingdom are all important actors in the international
arena with whom the United States cannot afford to jeopardize
foreign and economic relations. The decision in Matimak,
therefore, is not the end of the future of these important inter-
national relations.
When addressing this issue of alienage jurisdiction in sub-
sequent cases, whether involving Hong Kong companies or com-
panies of any current British Dependent Territory, courts
should adhere to sound, common sense, policy and precedents,
and remain flexible enough to accommodate the interdependen-
cies and dynamics of the international business world. The
United States, like Hong Kong, China, and the United King-
dom, cannot function at its most efficient and advantageous eco-
nomic level without relying on others for goods and services.
With this interdependence in mind, and because important for-
eign and economic relations are at risk, there should be no ques-
tion of alienage jurisdiction over any case involving a dispute
167 Generally, the terms used within the same statute should get the same
meaning. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 129 (1983);
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). But see Windert, 468 F. Supp. at
1246 n.3 (disputing that § 1332(a)(2) includes § 1603(a) definition).
168 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) provides for alienage jurisdiction when a civil
action is between a "citizen of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state
.... Id. See also supra note 23.
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between U.S. party and a Hong Kong company or any British
Dependent Territory company.
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